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Abstract. The philosophical debate about scientific models has, over the past thirty years 
or so, reached a high degree of sophistication. Yet, in spite of efforts to seek common 
ground with scientific practice, there remains the suspicion that philosophical accounts 
are sometimes too ‘free-floating’, in that they do not adequately reflect scientists’ views 
(and actual uses) of models. The present paper deals with one such scientific perspective, 
due to physicist Sir Rudolf Peierls (1907-1995). Writing thoroughly from the perspective 
of a theoretician with a deep appreciation for experimental physics, Peierls, in a series of 
papers, developed a taxonomy of scientific models, which – in spite of some inevitable 
arbitrariness – exhibits surprising points of convergence with contemporary philosophical 
accounts of how scientific models function. The present paper situates Peierls’s approach 
within the philosophical and scientific developments of his time, engages (in an immer-
sive way) with his proposed taxonomy, and argues that Peierls’s views – and others like 
them – warrant the recent philosophical shift from a focus on model-based representation 
to non-representational (e.g., exploratory) uses and functions of models.
Keywords: scientific models, modeling, scientific representation, exploration. 
1. Introduction
Scientific models and the activity of modelling in science have, in recent 
years, attracted considerable attention from philosophers of science. Sophisti-
cated philosophical accounts have been proposed regarding how models rep-
resent their targets and allow us to infer knowledge about them, and a plethora 
of case studies from the various special sciences have been worked out, many 
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of which engage with the cutting edge of contemporary science. What has 
sometimes been neglected, however, is the perspective of scientists themselves. 
To be sure, there are laudable exceptions, notably Daniela Bailer-Jones’s analy-
sis of scientists’ thoughts on scientific models [Bailer-Jones, 2003]. Yet how 
the widespread adoption of scientific modelling across the sciences ‘adds up’, 
so as to shape the production of new knowledge, remains a philosophically 
neglected question. At the risk of disappointing my readers, I must be up-front 
and admit that the current paper will not fill this lacuna. Any attempt to do so 
would require a breadth of coverage and a level of detailed analysis that would 
be impossible within the constraints of a single paper. What I will attempt, 
instead, is to show, by way of example, how scientific models have become 
the preferred way for scientists to deal with, and reflect on, a range of worthy 
goals: representing reality, reducing complexity, getting a grasp on novel and 
elusive phenomena, deriving potential explanations, exploring constraints and 
theoretical structures, implementing approximations, and studying limiting 
cases. Specifically, I will be engaging with the work of Sir Rudolf Peierls (1907-
1995), who was at the centre of many important twentieth-century develop-
ments in physics, without ever achieving the pop-science stardom of some of 
his contemporaries (notably Richard Feynman). Two papers, written in the 
1980s after his retirement, explicitly discuss different model types and their 
functions; while these lack philosophical rigour, they provide an interesting 
glimpse into the epistemic culture of modelling in physics, as experienced by 
one of its prime exponents.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses some 
of the history of scientific models, focussing on the shift from emphasizing 
mechanical models to a more inclusive notion of ‘model’ that accommodates, 
among others, analogical reasoning in physics. It also dicusses Mary Hesse’s 
influential mid-twentieth century text ‘Models and Analogies in Science’ (1963), 
which marks the beginning of a rapid growth of philosophical interest in 
models and their role in science. Section 3 surveys some of the theoretical 
tensions that afflict any philosophical attempts to come to a global characteri-
zation of what models are and how they function in inquiry. Section 4 sum-
marizes in some detail the seven-fold taxonomy of ‘model types’ proposed by 
Rudolf Peierls in a semi-popular article published in 1980 as ‘Model-Making 
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in Physics’ (and reprised in his 1987 ‘Models, Hypotheses and Approxima-
tions’). Peierls’s perspective is that of a practicing scientist who suspends his 
immediate research agenda and reflects on the broader direction of physics; 
he is not primarily concerned with the finer philosophical points concerning 
models and their functions. Taking his remarks at face value, then, requires 
immersing oneself in the – often ‘hands-on’ and outcome-oriented – epistemic 
culture of scientists using models for a variety of purposes. Such an immersive 
approach is rewarded, however, by insights into the practice of model-making 
and its guiding values, such as its recognition of pluralism – first and foremost, 
the realization ‘that different models serve quite different purposes, and they 
vary in their nature accordingly’ [Peierls, 1980, p. 3]. The fifth and final section 
relates the material presented thus far to recent attempts to shift philosophical 
attention from model-based representation to non-representational uses and 
functions of models. Some of these attempts have coalesced under the label 
of ‘exploratory modelling’ [Gelfert, 2016, pp. 71-100]; on this view, models – 
beyond representing actual targets – can probe modal and theoretical structure 
(e.g., by considering various counterfactual, e.g. higher- or lower-dimensional 
scenarios), generate potential explanations, or provide ‘proofs-of-principle’. 
Furthermore it is argued that models often play a regulative role in scientific in-
quiry more generally, by giving direction to prospective research programmes 
and setting them on course for future successes. 
2. Historical background: from analogies to models
When looking at the history of models in science, one may feel tempted 
to survey the history of science from the vantage point of our current under-
standing of the term ‘scientific model’ (which itself is far from uniform) and 
look for episodes that appear to fit with one’s preferred definition of what 
constitutes a scientific model. Yet such an approach would hardly do justice 
to the varied history of the term ‘model’ in scientific discourse – a task which 
is also beyond the scope of this paper. It will nonetheless be instructive to 
look at the (surprisingly recent) emergence of ‘model talk’ in science, and in 
physics in particular.
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It seems safe to say that systematic self-reflection on the uses and limita-
tions of models in physics did not begin in earnest until some time in the nine-
teenth century. While methodological reflection and sophisticated analyses of 
the status of hypotheses, theories, and observations can be found throughout 
the history of science, including in its early stages, these did not coalesce into 
a systematic discussion of the role and significance of models in scientific in-
quiry. In philosophy of science, the recognition that central models are central 
to the pursuit of science did not set in until even more recently. Only from the 
middle of the twentieth century onwards did philosophers of science shift their 
focus from theories to models – which, until then, had often been regarded 
as playing a merely auxiliary role in applying fundamental theories to specific 
situations. One important transformation that contributed to the remarkable 
rise of scientific models in physics from the nineteenth century onwards, and 
to their proliferation in the twentieth century and beyond, was the shifting of 
emphasis from mechanical models (i.e., real or imagined mechanical ‘stand-ins’ 
for real target systems) to a far more inclusive notion of ‘model’ (as reflected in 
twentieth-century expressions such as the ‘standard model’ in particle physics).
Consider Pierre Duhem’s endorsement of the use of analogy in physics. 
The idea of analogy derives its utility from the thought that relations in one 
domain resemble those in what may be an otherwise entirely separate do-
main, such that A is related to B (where A and B belong to one domain) like 
C is related to D (where these belong to the other domain). Whether such 
resemblance is merely formal or is underwritten by material similarity is of 
secondary importance for our purposes; at any rate, Duhem conceives of 
analogy primarily as a relation between sets of statements, more specifically 
between one theory and another: 
Analogies consist in bringing together two abstract systems; either one of them already 
known serves to help us guess the form of the other not yet known, or both being 
formulated, they clarify the other. There is nothing here that can astonish the most 
rigorous logician, but there is nothing either that recalls the procedures dear to ample 
but shallow minds. [Duhem, 1954, p. 97]
A good example is Christiaan Huygens’s proposal, in 1678, of his wave 
theory of light. In developing his theory, Huygens was guided by an analogy 
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with the theory of sound waves: the relations between the various properties 
and qualities of light are like those of sound waves, as described by acoustic 
theory. Understood in this way, analogy is, for Duhem, an entirely legitimate 
tool for studying one domain on the basis of our (more secure) knowledge of 
quite another domain. Sound waves, in our contemporary scientific vernacular, 
provided Huygens with a good theoretical model for how light propagates and 
behaves in various settings. 
This contrasts with Duhem’s forceful rejection of mechanical models as 
a way of expounding a new theory (rather than, say, merely illustrating it). 
Taking a textbook presentation of Maxwell’s theory of electromagnetism as 
his target of choice, Duhem strikes a polemical tone in his dismissal of what 
he takes to be an undue reification of theoretical relationships into mechani-
cal processes:
Here is a book intended to expound the modern theories of electricity and to expound 
a new theory. In it there are nothing but strings which move round pulleys which 
roll around drums, which go through pearl beads, which carry weights; and tubes 
which pump water while others swell and contract; toothed wheels which are geared 
to one another and engage hooks. We thought we were entering the tranquil and 
neatly ordered abode of reason, but we find ourselves in a factory. [Duhem, 1954, p. 7]
It is important to be clear about precisely what Duhem is criticizing. Given 
his earlier endorsement of analogical reasoning, Duhem cannot be categori-
cally opposed to the idea of relating one domain to another (qualitatively differ-
ent) one. Instead, what the quoted passage mocks is a style of reasoning – one 
in which the desire to visualize physical processes in purely mechanical terms 
masks the theoretically more ambitious task of understanding them in their 
own right. His hostility is thus directed at mechanical models only—as is also 
clear from the contrast implicit in the title of the chapter (‘Abstract Theories 
and Mechanical Models’) from which the quoted passage is taken—and ex-
tends neither to ‘theoretical models’ nor, necessarily, to other contemporary 
uses of the term ‘scientific model’ in physics. Whereas mechanical models 
encourage the hasty identification of the entities being visualized (‘pulleys’, 
‘drums’, ‘pearl beads’, ‘toothed wheels’, etc.) with the (unknown) actual physi-
cal processes, analogy makes it possible for us to make inferences about one 
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domain on the basis of knowledge about another, while at the same time 
acknowledging their qualitative difference.
A first sketch of a philosophical account of how analogies can underwrite 
the use of models in science was presented by Mary Hesse in her influential 
1963 essay Models and Analogies in Science, which is explicitly conceived 
of as a dialogue between a ‘Duhemist’ and his opponent, the ‘Campbellian’ 
(after the English physicist Norman Robert Campbell, 1880-1949). The dia-
logue begins with the Campbellian attributing to the Duhemist the following 
view: ‘I imagine that along with most contemporary philosophers of science, 
you would wish to say that the use of models or analogues is not essential to 
scientific theorizing and that […] the theory as a whole does not require to 
be interpreted by means of any model.’ The Duhemist, after conceding that 
‘models may be useful guides in suggesting theories’, replies as follows: ‘When 
we have found an acceptable theory, any model that may have led us to it can 
be thrown away.’ The Campbellian, by contrast, insists: ‘I, on the other hand, 
want to argue that models in some sense are essential to the logic of scientific 
theories.’ [Hesse, 1963, pp. 8-9] What is at stake in this dispute, then, is both 
the ontological question of what, essentially, models are in the first place and, 
importantly, also the extent to which they are admissible in inquiry.
Hesse’s own analogical account of scientific models begins by drawing 
a three-fold distinction between ‘positive’, ‘negative’, and ‘neutral’ analogies. 
Consider the billiard ball model of gases, which portrays gases as being com-
posed of tiny elastic ‘billiard balls’ that fill up a given volume and sometimes 
bounce off each other, in a way that is meant to account for properties such 
as pressure and temperature. Some characteristics are shared between the 
(imagined) billiard balls and the target system consisting of gas atoms: for 
example, the momentum that can be ascribed to individual constituents and 
the phenomenon of collision between them. This set of shared characteristics 
constitutes the positive analogy, whereas properties we know to belong to 
billiard balls, but not to gas atoms—such as colour—constitute the negative 
analogy of the model. Yet the positive and negative analogy together do not 
exhaust the set of all properties, as there will typically be properties of the 
model for which it is as yet unclear whether they (also) apply to its target 
system. These constitute what Hesse calls the neutral analogy of the model. 
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It is the neutral analogy that injects an exploratory element into the process 
of inquiry, since it offers the prospect of gaining new insights into the target 
system by studying the model in its place—a prospect that might ordinarily 
have seemed slim: ‘If gases are really like collections of billiard balls, except 
in regard to the known negative analogy, then from our knowledge of the 
mechanics of billiard balls we may be able to make new predictions about the 
expected behaviour of gases.’ [Hesse 1963, p. 10]
The 1950s and 1960s—that is, exactly the period during which Hesse and 
other philosophers of science began to consider models in their own right—
were a period of rapid growth in physics, much of which was driven by the 
development of ever more ambitious and sophisticated models in physics. In 
particle physics, the ‘standard model’ was beginning to be conceived—even if, 
arguably, it served more as a framework for theorizing than as a representation 
of any one target system in particular; quantum theory had gained sufficient 
maturity to also enter more applied subdisciplines—leading, amongst other 
developments, to the formation of solid-state physics as a separate subdisci-
pline and to the development of a myriad of quantum many-body models.1 
The other sciences, too, witnessed a growing reliance on models, driven, not 
least, by mathematical models in disciplines ranging from biology to eco-
nomics. This helped prepare the ground for further scientific and conceptual 
explorations concerning models and their role in inquiry—a development 
that continues unabated to this day. 
3. The ontology of models and the practice of modelling
The proliferation of models across the sciences makes it difficult to give 
a comprehensive and uncontroversial answer to the ontological question of 
what, in general, a scientific model is. Disagreement on general terms such 
as ‘knowledge’, ‘theory’, or ‘model’ is, of course, part and parcel of the philo-
sophical enterprise, yet there is an unavoidable trade-off between achieving 
1 For the emergence of solid-state physics as a recognized stand-alone subdiscipline, see 
especially [Weart, 1992]; for a philosophical survey of the variety of quantum many-body models 
in condensed matter physics, see [Gelfert 2015].
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conceptual clarity through stipulation and retaining adequate scope in rela-
tion to the issues that initially motivated our philosophical inquiry. In the 
present case, what generated philosophical interest in scientific models in the 
first place were the perceived growth of ‘model talk’ among scientists and the 
growing presence of models in scientific practice. In their attempts to make 
sense of what scientists call ‘models’, and of how they use them, philosophers 
of science created their own sprawling taxonomies, as is evident from this list 
of model-types, found in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: ‘Probing 
models, phenomenological models, computational models, developmental 
models, explanatory models, impoverished models, testing models, idealized 
models, theoretical models, scale models, heuristic models, caricature models, 
didactic models, fantasy models, toy models, imaginary models, mathematical 
models, substitute models, iconic models, formal models, analogue models 
and instrumental models’ [Frigg & Hartmann, 2012]. In light of this dazzling 
diversity, it is perhaps no surprise that Nelson Goodman, as early as in his 
1968 Languages of Art, voices the following lament: ‘Few terms are used in 
popular and scientific discourse more promiscuously than “model”.’ [Good-
man, 1968, p. 171] If this was true of science and popular discourse in the late 
1960s, it is no less true today.
The great variety of models employed in scientific practice makes vivid 
just how central the use of models is to contemporary science and, perhaps 
increasingly, to the self-image of scientists how rely on them. As John von 
Neumann once put it: ‘The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even 
try to interpret, they mainly make models.’ [von Neumann, 1961, p. 492] It 
might, however, also lead one to ask whether it is at all reasonable to look for 
a unified philosophical account of models. Given the vast range of things we 
call ‘models’, and the divergent uses to which they can be put, a one-size-fits-
all answer to the question ‘What is a model?’ may simply seem out of reach. 
One reaction has been to try to assimilate models to theories, thereby treating 
them as entirely auxiliary and subordinate. On this view, models may be, as 
Richard Braithwaite put it, ‘the most convenient way of thinking about the 
structure of the theory’ [Braithwaite, 1968, p. 91], but they are just that: ways 
of thinking about an underlying theory. Even more sternly, Rudolf Carnap 
urged his readers ‘to realize that the discovery of a model has no more than 
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an aesthetic or didactic or at best a heuristic value, but is not at all essential 
for a successful application of the physical theory’ [Carnap, 1969, p. 210].
Another standard reaction to the puzzling diversity of what constitutes 
a scientific model has been to argue that, as Gabriele Contessa puts it, ‘if all 
scientific models have something in common, this is not their nature but 
their function’ [Contessa, 2010, p. 194]. Amongst functional characteriza-
tions of models, a further distinction can be drawn between instantial and 
representational views. According to the former, models have their function 
in virtue of instantiating the axioms of a theory, where the latter is understood 
in terms of linguistic statements. By contrast, on the representational view, 
‘language connects not directly with the world, but rather with a model, whose 
characteristics may be precisely defined’; the model makes contact with the 
world only inasmuch as there is a ‘similarity between a model and designated 
parts of the world’ [Giere, 1999, p. 56]. Generally speaking, proponents of the 
instantial view regard models as primarily being in the business of ‘provid-
ing a means for interpreting formal systems’, whereas those who favour the 
representational view consider models to be ‘tools for representing the world’ 
[Giere, 1999, p. 44]. The representational view, in turn, can be construed by 
either highlighting the informational aspects of models or their pragmatic 
role in inquiry. The basic idea of the former is ‘that a scientific representation 
is something that bears an objective relation to the thing it represents, on 
the basis of which it contains information regarding that aspect of the world’ 
[Chakravartty, 2010, p. 198]; by contrast, the pragmatic view of model-based 
representation holds that models represent their targets in virtue of the cogni-
tive uses to which human reasoners put them.
The turn to pragmatic (or ‘practice-oriented’) aspects of scientific models 
has been a fairly recent development. It acknowledges that models are the 
outcome of a process of model construction which is itself responsive to the 
context of inquiry. On this view, the question ‘What is a model?’ simply cannot 
be answered satisfactorily without a proper consideration of the activity of 
modelling, which, according to pragmatic theorists of models, is characterized 
by ‘piecemeal borrowing’ [Suárez & Cartwright, 2008, p. 63] from a range of 
representational resources. Thinking of models as standing in purely objective 
(e.g., informational) relations to one another, and to their target systems, would 
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overlook the ineliminable role of beliefs, intentions, and cognitive interests of 
on the part of model users, as well as of the material constraints that come with 
the heterogeneous components that, typically, make up any real-world model 
of a phenomenon or target system. Shifting attention away from models and 
the abstract relations they stand in, towards modelling as a complex activity 
pursued by human agents, also involves – as Tarja Knuuttila puts it – a shift 
away from ‘the model-target dyad as a basic unit of analysis’ [Knuuttila, 2010, 
p. 142] towards a ‘triadic’ picture that acknowledges the equal importance of 
model, target, and user.
4. Rudolf Peierls and the culture of ‘model-making’
Given the relative recency of the aforementioned turn towards scientific 
practice in philosophical accounts of models, it is perhaps prescient that Rudolf 
Peierls, in 1980, published a paper titled ‘Model-Making in Physics’, in which 
he speaks of a ‘model-making habit’ and attributes to physicists a tendency ‘to 
use models of various kinds to aid their understanding of complicated physical 
situations’ [Peierls, 1980, p. 3]. At the time the paper was published, Peierls was 
in his early seventies and had already spent six years in retirement; his breezy 
presentation of various models in physics is, therefore, less of a summary of 
state-of-the-art scientific modelling than a reflection on the proliferation of 
models in physics since the middle of the twentieth century.
Peierls’s own career is closely linked to many of the main developments 
in twentieth-century physics. Born in 1907 in Berlin, Peierls studied at the 
universities of Berlin, Munich, and Leipzig, with stints in Switzerland and the 
Soviet Union, before escaping the deteriorating political situation in Germany 
by emigrating to Britain in 1933, where he eventually became a citizen in 1940. 
This allowed him to take up war work and led to his joining the Manhattan 
Project, though he remained critical of the pursuit of nuclear weapons (and 
later campaigned against their proliferation). His scientific work was unu-
sually diverse, with Peierls being described, by the mathematician Herbert 
S. Green, as ‘a highly competent, though not a notably creative mathemati-
cian; his principal interest was clearly in making calculations which would 
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lead to a deep understanding of physical phenomena, and he was adept at 
finding approximations which gave trustworthy numerical results’ [Green, 
1999]. Unlike some of his more famous contemporaries, Peierls did not seek 
the public limelight, and his choice of research topics, too, reflects a decidedly 
‘middle-of-the-road’ preference for soundness and applicability; this, I would 
argue, makes him a better representative than most for the bulk of research 
activity that constitutes post-war twentieth-century physics. 
In ‘Model-Making in Physics’, Peierls adopts very much the perspective 
of a practicing scientists who suspends his immediate research agenda and 
instead reflects on the broader shape of his discipline. He does not explicitly 
set out to seek common ground between, say, physics and philosophy of sci-
ence; neither does he promise a unified theory of how scientific models work. 
While he makes it his goal ‘to examine the nature and purpose of […] in some 
detail’, he immediately acknowledges ‘that different models serve quite different 
purposes, and they vary in their nature accordingly’ [Peierls, 1980, p. 3]. This 
in itself is noteworthy since it shifts, almost effortlessly, the emphasis from the 
ontological question ‘What is a model?’ to the more pragmatic question of how 
models achieve their varied functions. Before summarizing Peierls’s answer, 
however, it is worth emphasizing that he never intended his paper to be an 
up-to-date contribution to the philosophical debate. As a result, he makes no 
effort to engage with whatever philosophical debate of scientific models had 
developed by the time the paper was published – of which, by 1980, there had 
been a considerable amount. All the references are entirely to other papers in 
physics, and most of them refer to case studies Peierls is using for illustrative 
purposes, not to discussions of how models are being used in physics in general. 
While one might lament the lack of engagement with the extant philosophical 
literature, along with a number of conceptual infelicities on Peierls’s part that 
a closer engagement with philosophy of science might have prevented, his text 
nonetheless deserves to be taken seriously. This is why, in what follows, I have 
decided to take Peierls’s text at face value, treating it as an expression of a certain 
epistemic culture of model-based physics, and immersing myself in it, rather 
than taking him to task for, say, eliding various philosophical distinctions.
Peierls’s taxonomy of models lacks hierarchy and systematicity, and he 
readily acknowledges that his choice ‘of the categories, and the assignment 
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of specific models to them, is of course very subjective’2 (3), and that there is 
bound to be disagreement about individual assignments, yet not about ‘the 
width of the spectrum’ of cases considered. Peierls’s choice of the first of the 
seven ‘types’ of models he distinguishes – ‘Hypothesis (“Could be true”)’ – 
already makes clear that he has no truck with extant philosophical distinc-
tions, given that hypotheses are not usually lumped together with models. Yet, 
speaking as a scientific practitioner, Peierls notes that ‘hypotheses are often 
called models’, and any taxonomy of uses of models (as well as uses of the term 
‘model’) had better comment on its relation to hypotheses. And, to be sure, 
models are often invoked by hypotheses that ‘consist of a tentative explanation 
of a phenomenon’. Examples would be early models of the atom, such as the 
textbook models put forward by J.J. Thomson and Ernest Rutherford, which 
‘amount really to statements about the nature of the Universe which may 
or may not be correct’ (4). Peierls’s second type – ‘Phenomenological model 
(“Behave as if…”)’ – is more in line with established taxonomies in philosophy 
of science, though he is vague on the question of precisely what it takes for 
a model to count as ‘behaving as if ’ it were the real target system. According to 
Peierls, in a phenomenological model ‘a physical phenomenon [is] accounted 
for by a certain mechanism, but there is insufficient evidence to convince us 
that this is the correct explanation’ (5). For Peierls, whether or not a model 
counts as phenomenological, appears to be less a matter of “saving the phe-
nomena” (while remaining agnostic about what underlying processes might 
have brought about an observed phenomenon), than a matter of uncertainty 
about whether the proposed underlying mechanisms are, in fact, realized or 
not. Phenomenological models, then, are regarded as characteristic of research 
in its early stages. As a ‘very characteristic example’ (6), he discusses Pierre 
Weiss’s model of ferromagnetism, which posits that elementary magnets con-
tribute to the magnetization of a substance not only via their response to an 
external magnetic field, but also via ‘a “molecular field” proportional to the 
number of magnets already aligned’. This simple model helped explain the 
existence of a transition temperature, the Curie temperature, ‘at which the 
2 For the remainder of this section, numbers in round parentheses refer to the correspond-
ing page number in [Peierls, 1980].
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spontaneous magnetization goes continuously, but very steeply, to zero’. While 
later work revealed the model to be inadequate in a number of ways, it is ‘still 
useful if we want a quick orientation on the likely behaviour of a ferromag-
net in unfamiliar circumstances’. Phenomenological models, beyond merely 
reproducing observed phenomena and (sometimes) identifying potential 
causal mechanisms, also importantly play a way in regulating and guiding 
inquiry – a topic I shall return to in the final section.
The next two types of models – ‘Type 3: Approximation (Something is very 
small, or very large)’ and ‘Type 4: Simplification (Omit some features for clar-
ity)’ – are again labelled in a somewhat misleading manner, in that they really 
refer to different (though potentially co-existing) methodological approaches. 
When Peierls refers to them as ‘models’, this is best understood elliptically as 
referring to models generated by the (predominant) use of one or the other. 
‘Approximation’ – which, judging from the parenthetical characterization as 
‘Something is very small, or very large’, includes the consideration of limiting 
cases – is required whenever no closed solutions exist to the model equations 
and is considered, by Peierls, to be an ‘art’ that is ‘much more subtle than that 
of solving an equation exactly’ (7). The example discussed by Peierls is that 
of linear response models, which describe how a target system responds to 
an infinitesimal disturbance. Once again he notes that, even where (by some 
measure) ‘better’ models exist, linear approximations have their legitimate 
uses: e.g., ‘the stability of a system depends on the sign of its linear response 
coefficients for various possible disturbances’ (8). At the same time, one must 
take great care to also respect the inevitable limits on when a system’s response 
can be modelled as linear. For example, when calculating the electronic shell 
structure of the atom, higher-order calculations are important in order to lift 
degeneracy in the energy levels – contenting oneself with the linear approxima-
tion would miss out on key aspects of the physics of the atom. When to deploy 
the right sorts of approximations, Peierls argues, is a matter of ‘judgement and 
experience’; for the purpose of model-making and using models successfully, 
we cannot abstract away from the context of inquiry.
‘Simplification’, or the omission, for clarity, of some (known) features of the 
target system (‘Type 4’ [9]), is likewise an important approach in the construc-
tion of models. Peierls’s preferred example here is Peter Debye’s model for the 
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specific heat of solids. Debye essentially proposed a formula that interpolates 
between the (known) behaviour of solids at near-zero temperatures (when 
only a diminishing number of low-frequency vibrations of the solid are pos-
sible) and the maximum frequency of lattice vibrations (which, in reality, is 
determined by the lattice structure of the crystal, but which Debye chose ‘so 
as to get the total number of modes right’ [10], i.e. the maximum number of 
possible excitations for the total number of atoms in a crystal). This resulted 
in a model that is surprisingly useful even at intermediate temperatures. Yet 
the success of any given model also creates pitfalls, in particular for those 
who lose track of the model’s limitations. One such case for the Debye model 
is the thermal behaviour of beryllium. For beryllium, the difference between 
the ‘predicted’ Debye curve and actual measurements – that is, the curve that 
results from subtracting one from the other – had a hump-like structure, which 
some researchers – incorrectly – interpreted ‘as suggesting a transformation 
in this substance’. Yet this interpretation overlooked entirely that the Debye 
curve merely interpolates between two known constraints; its numerical values 
in-between make no claim to realism.
The fifth type, ‘Instructive model (No quantitative justification, but gives 
insight’), according to Peierls, achieves ‘even greater simplification’ at the cost 
of moving ‘even further away from a realistic description’, while ‘still retaining 
enough similarity with the true situation to help understanding something 
about its nature’ (13). This characterization, which Peierls acknowledges is ‘less 
sharp than previous dividing lines’, is admittedly vague: How much similarity 
with the true situation is ‘enough’, and how specific to the target system must 
our ‘understanding something about its nature’ really be? Yet, often what is 
needed at a certain point in inquiry is not numerical accuracy, or even quali-
tative similarity, but an estimation of, say, the expected order of magnitude 
of a process or phenomenon. This, Peierls argues, is just what such models 
are good at providing, for example in such cases as the mean free path model, 
transport phenomena, and conductivity: ‘For general orientation [such a] 
model is so useful that it is being used all the time even by those who are 
familiar with is weaknesses and pitfalls’, yet it stands to reason that there is, 
in turn, a very real risk of the model being used unthinkingly, by those who 
are less able to spot potential pitfalls.
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Peierls’s sixth type of model, ‘Type 6: Analogy (Only some features in 
common)’, echoes Mary Hesse’s account of scientific models as analogies (dis-
cussed in a previous section of this paper), though it is unlikely that Peierls 
would have closely engaged with Hesse’s work. Peierls posits that, in many 
situations, we ‘learn something about a physical system from the study of 
a simpler system which does not resemble it in all essentials, but has some 
of its typical features’ (14). Interestingly, he quickly moves to the discussion 
of scientific examples, most of which – Debye’s model for phonon scattering, 
the Ising model, the London model of superconductor – could have easily 
been fitted under one of the other categories. Had Peierls aimed for a more 
systematically ambitious taxonomy, he might have chosen analogy as an 
overarching framework that subsumes the various types of models – just 
as Hesse did – rather than as a separate category, or ‘type’, in its own right. 
Nonetheless, what is significant is Peierls’s recognition that even models that 
are known to be fundamentally flawed – such as Ising’s model of ferromag-
netism, which ignores many aspects of quantum many-body systems that are 
known to be of the utmost importance in determining the collective behav-
iour (including phase transitions) in solids – can still function as a source of 
insight: ‘Nevertheless much can be learnt from the model.’ (15) Importantly, 
‘variants of the Ising model have served as a proving ground for methods and 
approximations in this field’ (15). Once again, Peierls ranks pragmatic utility, 
and the way in which models – in spite of their flaws – can keep scientific 
research programmes progressive higher than their representational accuracy 
in absolute terms, as it were.
The final type of model, ‘Type 7: Gedanken experiments (Mainly to dis-
prove a possibility)’ covers thought experiments such as the Carnot cycle, 
Maxwell’s demon, Heisenberg’s gamma-ray microscope, and the Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen paradox. While again a non-standard usage of the term 
‘model’, Peierls’s decision to include thought experiments among the various 
types of models is nonetheless instructive. He notes that, by considering 
thought experiments, it is often possible to derive constraints on what is, 
and isn’t, possible. Thus, in thermodynamics, considering the Carnot cycle 
‘can, for example, place limits on the efficiency obtainable from an engine 
working in a given temperature range’ (16); the idea, then, is not that the 
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Carnot cycle could, or should, be brought about in the real world, but rather 
that any real-world process must respect certain constraints that are brought 
into sharp focus – albeit counterfactually – by the corresponding thought 
experiment. Sometimes, thought experiments do not establish (im)possi-
bilities, but – like models used for instruction – serve illustrative purposes. 
This, Peierls argues, is the case with Heisenberg’s γ-ray microscope, which 
imagines attempting to see an electron in a microscope: in order to achieve 
a sufficiently good resolution, one would need to use radiation of sufficiently 
short wavelengths – i.e. γ-rays – yet any encounter of an electron with such 
radiation would cause an uncontrollable change in its momentum, leading 
to an unavoidable trade-off between locating the electron and measuring its 
momentum – Heisenberg’s famous uncertainty relation. Heisenberg’s thought 
experiment ‘was not used to prove anything, because the uncertainty relation 
could be deduced directly from the formalism of quantum mechanics’ (16), 
but it helped physicists ‘understand the nature of the new principle without 
recourse to the mathematical formalism’ (17).
Peierls’s seven model ‘types’ span different levels of inquiry, ranging from 
general methodological approaches – approximation and simplification – to 
specific contexts (e.g., instruction), uses (e.g., in order to ‘save the phenom-
ena’), and formats of representation (e.g., ‘statements about the nature of the 
Universe which may or may not be correct’). One may deem his taxonomy 
haphazard and unsystematic – yet, arguably, no more so than the messy and 
disunified character of scientific practice. Indeed, it could be argued that the fact 
that Peierls foregoes any strongly normative stance – except for the recurring 
injunction to remain aware of the limitations of one’s models – simply reflects 
the epistemic culture associated with ‘model-making’ in physics. Some mod-
els – because of their wide applicability, or because they feature prominently 
in shared curricula of physics education – constitute common ground, to 
which even proponents of competing research programmes can jointly retreat. 
Others are themselves hotly contested. And even where there is in-principle 
agreement on the utility of a particular approach, trade-offs between different 
desiderata – simplicity, numerical accuracy, generality, etc. – are the norm 
rather than the exception. As noted above in relation to the Debye model, 
some researchers place considerable (even excessive) faith in the realism of 
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their models; others adopt a thorough-going instrumentalist attitude.3 Yet, as 
in the case of the messy world of experimental physics, ‘[w]hen added together, 
these goings-on in a particular domain form what one might call an epistemic 
culture’ [Knorr-Cetina, 1991, p. 107]. Usually, the term ‘epistemic culture’ has 
been associated with specific sub-disciplines in science. Karin Knorr-Cetina 
famously characterized the epistemic culture of particle physics in terms of 
its intensely collaborative research environment and its extreme reliance on 
computational methods, leading simultaneously to a ‘relative loss of the em-
pirical’ and ‘a loss of epistemic status of the individual’ [Knorr-Cetina, 1991, 
p. 120], as compared with other subdisciplines in physics and other branches 
of science. One might worry that referring to model-making in physics as an 
‘epistemic culture’ creates an illusion of unity and masks the great diversity of 
domains across which, as we have seen, models in physics are being deployed. 
At the same time, it has often been observed that models in physics ‘travel’ from 
one discipline to another: every physics student is familiar with the ubiquity 
of the harmonic oscillator equations in various seemingly unrelated branches 
of physics, and even models that were originally intended for highly specific 
target systems, such as the Ising model of ferromagnetism, have over time been 
applied to a wide range of phenomena, from spin glasses to systems of neurons. 
Without a shared body of tacit knowledge about when, and how, to deploy 
models successfully – without, that is, a shared culture of modelling – it would 
seem difficult to explain such mobility of models across disciplinary boundaries.
5. Representation, exploration, and regulation
Our discussion so far, like much of philosophical discourse on scientific 
models, has – almost unreflectively – used the idiom of representation in con-
nection with how models function. It is indeed commonplace to find models 
characterized exclusively as ‘tools for representing the world’ [Giere, 1999, p. 44] 
and to measure the success of a given model by how well it matches physical 
reality. When a model is tailored to specific phenomena and is intended to 
3 Preferences for realism or instrumentalism among scientists are often fleeting; on this 
point, see [Gelfert, 2005].
66 Axel Gelfert
represent specific target systems, such a view has a lot going for it. Who, in 
all seriousness, would doubt that scientists often help themselves to models 
as ‘stand-ins’ for real target systems which scientists know of, but which they 
cannot directly access or give a complete characterization of? The ability of 
scientific models to enable us to draw inferences about actual target systems 
is surely one of the great attractions of using models in scientific inquiry.
Yet it takes only a moment’s reflection to realize that representing actual 
target system – or representation, simpliciter – is just one way in which models 
are being applied in science. One might think that this is because of the inevi-
table use of abstraction, idealization, and approximation in the construction 
of models, all of which render model descriptions strictly speaking false. Yet 
representations obviously do not need to be completely accurate or complete 
in order to represent their targets. Partial representation, and even misrepre-
sentation, are entirely compatible with models being ‘stand-ins’ for actual target 
systems. After all, for a model to represent its target, we should not require that 
it be a perfect, or even a particularly good, representation.4 What we should 
require, though, is that, for something to be a representation, it should have 
a target in the actual world – put crudely, it should be doing some represent-
ing. This is not to deny that there are some hard ontological questions that 
a full account of model-based representation ought to be able to address. How 
much can a putative representation get wrong about its target, while still being 
considered a representation of said target – rather than a failed, or vacuous, 
attempt at representing (as, arguably, in the case of phlogiston)? Furthermore, 
there have been sophisticated attempts to widen the range of admissible targets, 
e.g., by including fictions among them. Notwithstanding pronouncements to 
the effect that ‘there is absolutely no difference in kind between fictional and 
real-object representation – other than the existence or otherwise of the target’ 
[Suárez, 2004, p. 770], even such an inclusive approach does not adequately 
capture the more overtly non-representational uses of models.
 In recent years, there has been a growing recognition that the activity 
of scientific modeling goes well beyond the task of deriving representations 
of real-world target systems. Recent papers in this vein speak of the activity 
4 For a critique of the ideal of perfection in scientific modelling, see [Teller, 2001].
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of ‘modeling without models’ [Levy, 2015] or of ‘models in search of targets’ 
[Gelfert, 2018]. As Arnon Levy notes:
When a model is proposed it might not be clear at first what target it is tied to, and 
there might be a period in which the right target is sought. But later, assuming the 
model is retained, this issue is usually clarified. [Levy, 2015, p. 796]
A similar sentiment was evident in Peierls’s discussion of different model-
types: Recall how Peierls discusses Weiss’s model of ferromagnetism – which 
posited the existence of ‘microscopic magnets’ even in the absence of a theory 
of what might constitute these – as ‘very characteristic’ of early-stage modeling; 
similarly, in his discussion of the Ising model of ferromagnetism, he noted 
the tenuous nature of assigning target systems:
The model is unrealistic for ferromagnetism, because if the atomic spin is greater than 
½ it has more than two orientations, and if it is ½, quantum effects are not negligible. 
The model is slightly more realistic for alloys, except that in metallic alloys the inter-
action between atoms is in part mediated by the conduction electrons, and such an 
interaction is by no means limited to nearest neighbours. [Peierls, 1980, p. 15]
As it turns out, for a model to function as a tool of scientific inquiry, it need 
not – at least not initially – refer to any real-world target system in particular. 
Even in the absence of a uniquely identifiable target, ‘much can be learnt from 
the model’ [Peierls, 1980, p. 15].
It would be wrong, however, to think of this indeterminacy with respect 
to a model’s target as solely due to initial confusion or ambiguity in the early 
stages of inquiry, which always must be – and eventually will be – rectified. 
Tailoring a model to a specific target may be a promising strategy when we 
have already developed a good grasp of what constitutes, and what causal 
factors might contribute to, the phenomena in question. Yet in the absence 
of comprehensive theoretical knowledge – that is, in the context of explora-
tory research – the varied tasks of stabilizing phenomena, delineating their 
causal substrate, separating signal from noise, etc. are hardly straightforward. 
Sometimes it may not even be desirable to prematurely focus on certain tar-
get systems at the expense of others. Much of scientific modelling serves the 
68 Axel Gelfert
purpose of exploring theoretical relationships, establishing ‘no-go’ theorems 
(thereby exploring the modal structure of potential phenomena), providing 
proofs of principle (which need not, in fact, be instantiated) – in all of these 
cases, focussing on the goal of representing specific real-world target systems 
would run the risk of impeding, rather than furthering, our understanding of 
the science involved, as a closer look at exploratory modelling in science reveals.
Recent case studies of exploratory modelling in science have shown that, 
under conditions of exploratory research, models can function in a variety of 
ways: as starting points for future inquiry, as proofs of principle, as sources 
of potential explanations, and as a tool for reassessing the suitability of the 
target system. (See also [Gelfert, 2016, pp. 71-100].5) This list is meant to be 
neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive; as already mentioned, sometimes 
a fruitful line of future inquiry can be identified by looking at a range of po-
tential target systems and considering whether any of them (or any aspect of 
them) are captured by a given (e.g. mathematical) model. Interestingly, this 
is just what Peierls states with respect to the Ising model. Having noted that 
the Ising model’s failure to successfully represent does not preclude learning 
from it, he continues as follows: 
For example the Onsager solution for the two-dimensional case [of the Ising model] 
demonstrates that the specific heat is not merely discontinuous at the critical point 
[…], but tends to infinity as the critical point is approached either form below or from 
above. This helped in the development of the theory of phase transitions, which by 
now is a very sophisticated branch of statistical mechanics. Several variants of the 
Ising model have served as a proving ground for methods and approximations in the 
field. [Peierls, 1980, p. 15]
In other words, Peierls explicitly recognizes that models can serve as 
‘proofs of principle’ and explore the structure of underlying theoretical frame-
works, not in virtue of, but instead of representing actual target systems.
There is another way in which the utility of models in physics extends beyond 
their representational success. Models often ‘give stability to scientific practice’ 
5 The framework of ‘exploratory modelling’ has since also been fruitfully applied to case 
studies from bioengineering [Poznic, 2016], mathematical biology [Gelfert, 2018], astronomy 
[Wilson, 2017], and mesoscopic physics [Shech and Gelfert, this issue]. 
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[Gelfert, 2015, p. 224] by serving a regulative purpose. As mentioned earlier, 
the same model templates – e.g. in the case of mathematical models, the same 
equations – may travel across disciplinary boundaries, adding to the cohesion of 
the scientific enterprise. Scientists themselves acknowledge that models are not 
only used to derive predictions about specific target systems, but, as Peierls puts 
it with regard to the Weiss model, are ‘useful if we want a quick orientation on 
the likely behaviour of a ferromagnet in unfamiliar circumstances’ [Peierls, 1980, 
p. 8]. Deploying models at crucial junctures, whether in order to gain a ‘quick 
orientation’ or contribute to the development of a serviceable theory, can be an 
effective way of giving direction to a given process of inquiry and set it on course 
for future successes. Making decisions about when to rely on models, and which 
model to use, is ‘where judgement and experience comes in’, specifically that 
of ‘the experienced physicist’ [Peierls, 1980, 8]. Who is to be credited with the 
requisite experience is determined, in part, by the recurring norms and direc-
tives associated with the prevailing epistemic culture. Criteria of model choice 
themselves evolve from the collective repetition of the acts of choosing (and, 
where appropriate, dismissing) models; over time, they become what may be 
called ‘normative-directival complexes’ [Moraczewski, 2014, p. 41], which feed 
into, and in turn are shaped by, scientists’ collective practices of model-making.
There will always remain the unavoidable risk of mistaking one kind of 
model for another, and even the best model – if ever there could be such 
a thing – may, on occasion, lead us into error. But, as Peierls puts it in a later 
paper, ‘one also has to guard against the opposite mistake, of being too timid 
in learning something from an approach whose basis is not formally estab-
lished’ [Peierls, 1987, p. 95]. Yet such is the fallible nature of all inquiry, and 
exploring the structure of the empirical world around us requires us to take 
a chance. Science is not for the timid.
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